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Abstract
We consider an ad-financed media firm that chooses the ideological location of its
news and targets consumers who can share the news with their followers on social
media. After studying how each targeted consumer’s incentive to share the news is
shaped by the location of the news and the distribution of her followers’ ideological
locations, we study the firm’s strategy to maximize the breadth of news sharing and find
that when the mean (respectively, the variance) of the followers’ ideological locations
is a convex (respectively, concave) function of a targeted consumer’s location, the firm
is likely to produce polarized news.
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“What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of
its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention...”
(Simon, 1971)
1 Introduction
Social media has become a very important source for news consumption. According to Matsa
and Shearer (2018), as of August 2018, two-thirds of Americans report that they consume
some news on social media – with two in ten doing so often. Among different social media,
Facebook remains the most relevant: 45% of Americans consume news on Facebook.
This success of social media, however, is viewed with suspicion as some fear that the
tendency whereby social media users end up mainly consuming like-minded news would
prevent them from digesting diverse viewpoints about important issues. Although people
express such concerns by pointing out problems such as filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) or echo
chambers (Sunstein, 2017), one might think that homophily or social network structure is
a more fundamental source of the problem. Indeed, by analyzing data from US Facebook
users, Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015) found that homophily is the most important
factor limiting their exposure to attitude-challenging content.1 Even if there is a consensus
that homophily on social media leads to more consumption of like-minded news, there is
mixed evidence about whether social media leads to political polarization; Barberá (2015)
and Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2017) find evidence inconsistent with polarization, while
Allcott et al. (2020), Levi (2021), and Yanagizawa-Drott, Petrova and Enikolopov (2019)
find evidence consistent with polarization.
This paper contributes to the debate on the relationship between social media and news
polarization by focusing on the supply of news and addresses the following questions. How
does the structure of social networks on social media affect news sharing and thereby shape
the incentive for a media firm to choose the ideological bias of its news? Under what condi-
tions is the media firm incentivized to provide polarized news? Indeed, Kümpel, Karnowski
and Keyling (2015), who review 109 papers on news sharing on social media published by
1Similarly, Halberstam and Knight (2016) analyzed information from 2.2 million Twitter users on the
day before the 2012 US general elections and found that, due to homophily, people are disproportionately
exposed to tweets from like-minded others.
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communication or computer scientists, call for a theory emphasizing the role of the social
networks of followers on the decision to share news. This is exactly what we attempt to
accomplish.
To answer the above questions, we consider a three-tiered hierarchy: a media firm, direct
consumers and their followers on social media. The media firm sends its news to targeted
direct consumers, who in turn decide whether to share the news with their followers. We
show that the incentive for a direct consumer to share a given news item depends on the
ideological location of the news as well as the mean and the variance of the locations of her
followers, which in turn depend on the direct consumer’s own ideological position. Therefore,
to understand news polarization, it is important to know how extremists’ followers differ from
those of moderates in terms of the mean and the variance of their locations. In fact, it is
known that ideologically more extreme individuals tend to be more homophilous than more
moderate ones (Boutyline and Willer, 2017). As our main result, we find that when the
mean (respectively, the variance) of followers’ ideological locations is a convex (respectively,
concave) function of a direct consumer’s location, the media firm is likely to produce polarized
news. In contrast, when the mean is concave or the variance is convex, it is likely to produce
unbiased news.
Our questions are motivated by anecdotal evidence from the US presidential election
in 2016. Over one hundred websites with false content were created by teenagers from
Macedonia, seeking advertising revenues propelled by sharing of their news on Facebook
(Silverman and Alexander, 2016). The teenagers were using Facebook to drive traffic to
their websites where they had ads from Google. Their sites produced misleading partisan
content and obtained more engagement than op-eds and commentary pieces from major
media (NPR, 2016). Even though our model does not make distinction between fake news
and true news, our results help to understand when polarized news is more likely to be
shared than less polarized news.
In Section 2, we present our baseline model, in which consumers are distributed over an
interval [0, 1] of ideological space and a media firm chooses the ideological location of its news
to maximize its advertising revenue, which is proportionate to the measure of readers. In
addition, the media firm chooses an interval of given length to target direct consumers. We
assume that the utility from reading the news has a quadratic loss. We adopt an altruistic
motive for news sharing (Boyd, Golder and Lotan, 2010; Small, 2011; Holton et al., 2014) and
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assume that a targeted consumer shares the news if it is relevant enough to her followers, i.e.,
if the average benefit of her followers from reading the news is larger than the attention tax
she imposes on them by sharing the news. The attention tax captures the opportunity cost of
attention, as sharing news with a friend induces the latter to pay attention to it, which does
not necessarily mean that the latter reads it. Using Simon’s (1971) expression, we assume
that sharing news “consumes the attention of its recipients”. In a world of information
overload, the attention tax can be high.
In Section 3, we consider no targeting in the sense that the target interval is equal to
[0, 1]. For simplicity, we assume that the constant utility from reading the news is large
enough that all consumers who have access to the news read it. Under this assumption,
profit maximization is equivalent to maximizing the measure of the direct consumers who
share the news, which we define as the breadth of news sharing. If the attention tax is low
enough, by locating the news at the middle, the media firm can induce all direct consumers
to share the news. Hence, we focus on the case in which the attention tax is not small. As
an important intermediary result, we show that the average benefit that followers obtain
from a shared news item can be decomposed into a constant, minus the variance of their
locations, minus a square of the difference between the news location and the mean of their
locations. As a main result, we find that news polarization is likely to occur if the mean
of the followers’ ideological locations is a convex function of a direct consumer’s location
and/or the variance is a concave function. To provide an intuition for why convex mean
leads to news polarization, suppose that the mean is increasing and convex over [0, 1/2].2
This implies that the mean followers of two left-wing extremists are more closely located
than those of two moderates. This can induce news polarization because, as the interval
of direct consumers who share a news item expands, the marginal consumer’s benefit from
sharing it decreases more slowly when the news is located close to the extremists than when
it is located close to the moderates. However, polarization does not entail choosing a news
location equal to 0 or 1 because the media firm does not need further polarization of the
news once it is extreme enough to induce the most extreme direct consumer to be indifferent
between sharing the news and not, which we call the limit polarization.
In Section 4, we study competition between two media firms: firm L and firm R. All direct
consumers receive a news item from each firm, but each consumer can share at most one
2We consider a symmetric distribution of both direct readers and their followers around 1/2.
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news item. We find that under mild conditions, as long as polarization occurs in the baseline
model without competition, polarization also occurs under competition. When firm R’s
news becomes more polarized, additional right-wing consumers share its news whereas some
moderate consumers stop sharing it. Compared to the same change in news location in the
baseline model without competition, we find that the gain among right-wing consumers is the
same whereas the loss among moderate consumers is typically smaller under competition.
This is because the benefit that a moderate obtains by exercising the option of sharing
firm L’s news decreases as her position moves to the right whereas in the baseline model,
consumers have no outside option, which is akin to having an outside option that does not
depend on their location.
In Section 5, we provide three extensions of the baseline model. The first allows the firm
to target an interval of consumers to show the news. When direct consumers are distributed
uniformly, we find that it is a weakly dominant strategy for the firm to choose the same
location of news as in the baseline model and to make the left end of the target interval
coincide with the left marginal consumer who is indifferent between sharing the news and
not. In the second extension, we add one additional layer of followers to consider resharing
the shared news. We define a measure of homophily and show that news polarization in
the baseline model implies news polarization in the extension as long as the homophily
increases as consumers become more extreme. In the third extension, we study the depth-
maximization strategy. We allow for many layers of followers and characterize the strategy
that maximizes the depth of sharing, i.e., the number of times the news is shared following
down the layers of communication. We find that as long as the attention tax is not small,
depth maximization requires targeting the direct consumer with the lowest variance and
locating the news at the mean location of the targeted consumer’s followers.
Our work is closely related to the literature on demand-driven media bias (Gentzkow,
Shapiro and Stone, 2015) that assumes that consumers enjoy reading news that confirms their
biased beliefs. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001)
use a Hotelling-type model to study media bias. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) consider
price competition between two newspapers, and media bias emerges as each firm adopts
a maximal differentiation strategy to soften price competition. By contrast, Gabszewicz,
Laussel and Sonnac (2001) obtain minimal differentiation because the firms’ main revenue
sources are advertising and prices are constrained to be nonnegative, eliminating the force
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of differentiation to relax price competition. In addition, in both papers, a monopoly has
no gain from choosing a location different from the middle. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to embed social networks of followers into a model of demand-driven media
bias to study how news sharing and news bias are shaped by the characteristics of the
social networks. Empirical papers on demand-driven media bias include Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2010) and Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder (2011). Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)
find that readers have an economically significant preference for like-minded news and that
firms respond strongly to consumer preferences. Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder (2011) find
evidence that newspapers cater to readers’ partisan tastes on news about unemployment,
trade deficits and budget deficits.
The literature on social media is mainly empirical and studies how social media af-
fects voting, protests, xenophobia, polarization and the consumption of fake news (see Zhu-
ravskaya, Petrova and Enikolopov, 2020, for a survey). Our paper is more related to the
empirical papers studying polarization, which we reviewed at the beginning of the introduc-
tion.3 In particular, a very recent study by Levi (2021) based on a large field experiment on
Facebook finds that newsfeed algorithm of Facebook limits exposure to counter-attitudinal
news and thus increases polarization. There are several theoretical papers on social media.
In terms of the categories of players, our paper is similar to Fainmesser and Galeotti (2020),
which studies the interaction among marketers, influencers and followers as we study the in-
teraction among media firms, direct consumers and followers; direct consumers in our model
play the role of influencers in their model. Apart from this common point, the two papers
are very different because they are not interested in news polarization and instead study
competitive equilibria where each influencer chooses her amount of sponsored and organic
content. Berman and Katona (2020) study how curation algorithm of a social media affects
polarization when each receiver chooses the number of senders to follow and each sender
chooses the quality of her content. Contrary to the empirical finding of Levi (2021), they
find that curation algorithm can reduce polarization as it induces readers to follow a larger
number of senders. Their research is complementary to ours as we plan to work on the role
of newsfeed algorithm in our setting in the future. De Cornière and Sarvary (2018) study
how content bundling by social media, i.e., social media shows news content together with
3See Tucker et al. (2018) for a review of the literature on social media, political polarization and political
disinformation.
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user-generated content (UGC), affects the profit of newspapers and their incentive to invest
in quality. However, they consider neither news sharing nor network structure of followers.
Kranton and McAdams (2020) study how social networks affect news veracity when news
producers should incur costs to produce true news.4 They find that veracity is low in dense
networks when news producers are financed by advertising. Although we focus on a different
question of news polarization, both papers share some common features. First, both study
how social networks affect the supply side of news. Second, consumers who receive a news
story directly from a producer decide to share or not the story with their followers. Last,
each producer’s revenue is proportional to the number of readers,5 which is determined by
the number of consumers who share its news. Finally, what distinguishes our paper from all
other papers is that we consider a rich structure of followers characterized by the mean and
the variance of their ideological distributions and study how the distribution of the mean
and the variance affects news polarization.
The next section presents our baseline model. All the proofs, but for those of Lemma 1
and Proposition 6 which are presented in the main text, are gathered in Appendix.
2 The Baseline Model
In this section, we present our baseline model, which has three categories of players: a media
firm, direct consumers and followers.
The media firm and consumers The media firm chooses the ideological location of its
news y ∈ [0, 1]. We consider free news financed by advertising revenue. There is a continuum
of consumers, who are also users of social media. Each consumer is located on the interval
4There are other papers studying news sharing in social networks. Campbell, Leister and Zenou (2019)
build a dynamic model with two types of news (mass market and niche market) and two types of individuals.
Each individual receives news from randomly sampled friends and shares one news item. They find that
greater connectivity and homophily concurrently increase the prevalence of the niche market content and
polarization. Bloch, Demange and Kranton (2018) study the transmission of rumors on social networks in
a model with two possible states of nature and two types of agents (unbiased or biased). They find that a
social network can serve as a filter: unbiased agents block messages from parts of the network that contain
many biased agents.
5They also analyze a setting in which producers earn revenue from each consumer who takes a specific
action based on their news story.
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[0, 1]. The utility that a consumer located at x obtains from reading a news located at y is
U(x, y) = u− (x− y)2,
where u > 0 and (x−y)2 captures the disutility from the mismatch between the news opinion
and the consumer’s ideal opinion. Consumers read the news whenever they have access to
it and obtain a nonnegative utility from reading it.
Direct consumers and followers We assume that the media firm can target an interval of
consumers of length l ∈ (0, 1], where l is a parameter that depends on the financial resources
of the firm. Each targeted consumer receives news from the media firm. Those consumers
who can be targeted by the media firm are called direct consumers. Direct consumers are
distributed over [0, 1] according to the distribution function F with density f > 0, which is
assumed to be symmetric around 1/2. The particular case of l = 1 is called no targeting.
Each direct consumer has followers, who are also called indirect consumers. Those who
follow a direct consumer have access to the news only if it is shared by the direct consumer.
We assume that every direct consumer has a distinct group of followers of equal measure,
which is normalized to one. Given a direct consumer located at x, her followers are dis-
tributed according to density g̃( · ;x). We assume that the distribution of followers z ∈ [0, 1]
of a consumer located at x is symmetric to the distribution of followers of a consumer located
at 1− x such that g̃(z;x) = g̃(1− z; 1− x).
News sharing The existing literature from communication science and computer science
identifies two motives for news sharing: an altruistic motive (Boyd, Golder and Lotan, 2010;
Small, 2011; Holton et al., 2014) and a self-serving motive (Boyd, Golder and Lotan, 2010;
Ma, Lee and Goh, 2011; Lee and Ma, 2012). We adopt the altruistic motive and assume
that a direct consumer shares a news item if she reads it and if the average benefit that
her followers obtain from reading it is larger than the attention tax τ she imposes on them
by sharing the news. The attention tax represents the opportunity cost of attention, as
news sharing by a direct consumer induces each follower to pay attention to it, which does
not necessarily mean reading the whole news article. Using Simon (1971)’s expression, we
assume that sharing news “consumes the attention of its recipients”. A follower can discover
the values of u and y by paying attention to the news and then decide whether to read it.
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Let B(x, y) denote the average benefit that the followers of a direct consumer located at




max{U(z, y), 0} g̃(z;x) dz. (1)
Our altruistic approach regarding news sharing can be reconciled with standard utility
maximization based on self-serving motives such as improving one’s social status if the sharer
attaches positive (negative) utilities to the positive (negative) reactions from her followers
such as likes (dislikes) on Facebook or hearts on Twitter.6
Profit The media firm maximizes its advertising revenue, which is proportionate to the
traffic to the firm’s news site (Gentzkow, Shapiro and Stone, 2015). The traffic is equivalent
to the measure of readers. Given the location of its news y, the profit of the firm is given by
π(y) = (1− α)D0(y) + αD1(y),
where D0(y) and D1(y) are the demand from the direct readers and that from the indirect
readers, respectively, and α ∈ (0, 1) captures the importance the firm assigns to the indirect
demand relative to the direct one.
We assume that u is large enough that every consumer has an incentive to read the news.
Assumption 1. u is large enough that U(x, y) > 0 for any (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2.
This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis because under the assumption, every
targeted consumer reads the news, and every follower also reads it as long as the news is
shared. Therefore, profit maximization is equivalent to maximizing the measure of targeted
consumers who share the news, which is called the breadth of news sharing:
6Suppose that a direct consumer receives a like (resp., dislike) from a follower located at z whenever
U(z, y) ≥ τ (resp., U(z, y) < τ) and that the difference U(z, y)− τ (resp., τ −max{U(z, y), 0}) measures the
intensity of the feedback received. Then, we have:




(U(z, y)− τ) g̃(z;x) dz,
and




(τ −max{U(z, y), 0}) g̃(z;x) dz.
If a direct consumer shares news if and only if E(intensity of likes) − E(intensity of dislikes) ≥ 0, then she
shares news if and only if B(x, y)− τ ≥ 0.
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Definition 1 (Breadth of News Sharing). The breadth of sharing a news item is the measure
of direct consumers who share it.
In the next section, we study the news location which maximizes the breadth of sharing.
Due to the symmetry of the problem, if y∗ maximizes total demand, so does 1−y∗. Therefore,
it is sufficient to conduct analysis only over half of the interval. Henceforth, we restrict
attention to y ∈ [0, 1/2] without loss of generality.
3 Breadth-maximizing location: No targeting
In this section, we study the breadth-maximizing location of news in the case of no targeting,
which means that the target interval is equal to [0, 1]. Targeting is considered in Section 5.1.
Let µ(x) and σ2(x) represent the mean and the variance, respectively, of the locations of




z g̃(z;x) dz and σ2(x) =
∫ 1
0
(z − µ(x))2 g̃(z;x) dz.
We consider a general model in which the main primitives are the distribution of µ(x)
and σ2(x) over x ∈ [0, 1]. The next lemma shows that the benefit B(x, y) is a function of
µ(x) and σ2(x) regardless of the density of followers g̃(z;x). This is due to a quadratic loss
in the utility from reading a news item.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the average benefit that the followers of a direct consumer
located at x obtain when the latter shares a news item located at y is B(x, y) = u− σ2(x)−
(y − µ(x))2.
Proof.
B(x, y) = Ez
(
u− (z − y)2
)
= u− Ez ((z − µ(x))− (y − µ(x)))2
= u− σ2(x)− (y − µ(x))2
Therefore, given a direct consumer located at x, the benefit of news sharing decreases
with the ideological dispersion of her followers σ2(x) and with the mismatch between the
location of the news and the mean location of her followers (y − µ(x))2.
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We below introduce a technical assumption that adds regularity to B(·, y), thus simplify-
ing our analysis. Under the assumption, the set of locations of direct consumers that share
a news item is an interval, that is, if two direct consumers of distinct ideological locations
are willing to share a news item, then any direct consumer located between the two is also
willing to do so. We also assume that small changes in the ideological slant of a news item
induce small changes in direct consumers’ willingness to share it.
Assumption 2. For any y, B(·, y) is strictly quasiconcave and differentiable.
Let xl(y) and xr(y), with xl(y) ≤ xr(y), denote the limits of the interval of direct con-
sumers who share a news item located at y ∈ [0, 1]. From Assumption 1, every follower reads
the news if she has access to it. Thus, the indirect demand for a news item located at y is




f(x) dx = F (xr(y))− F (xl(y)) .
Let y∗ represent the breadth-maximizing news location. We first identify a straightfor-
ward case of no polarization.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if the attention tax is low enough that even the
most extreme consumer is willing to share news located at 1/2, then no polarization y∗ = 1/2
maximizes the breadth of sharing because D1(1/2) = 1.
Therefore, henceforth, we consider τ > B(x = 0, y = 1/2). In this case, it is always
possible to have a location y (around 1/2) such that both xl(y) > 0 and xr(y) < 1. The
locations where either xl(y) = 0 or xr(y) = 1 are of special interest and will be called the
limit polarization locations.
Definition 2 (Limit polarization locations). Let y (resp., y) denote the closest location
from the center such that xl(y) = 0 (resp., xr(y) = 1). We will refer to y as the left
limit-polarization location and to y as the right limit-polarization location.
From the symmetry of the distribution of followers, y = 1− y.












Consider a consumer x̂(y) ∈ {xl(y), xr(y)} indifferent between sharing the news and not.
Then, we have
u− σ2(x̂)− (y − µ(x̂))2 = τ . (2)




2 (y − µ)
2µx (y − µ)− σ2x
. (3)
We introduce our last assumption.
Assumption 3. We assume that there is some degree of homophily such that for any y,
µ (xl(y)) < y < µ (xr(y)).
Note first that the inequalities in the assumption require some homophily because without
any homophily, µ(x) would be a constant that does not depend on x, clearly violating
the inequalities. Suppose now that the assumption is not satisfied such that µ (xl(y)) <
µ (xr(y)) < y holds (respectively, y < µ (xl(y)) < µ (xr(y)) holds). Then, from Lemma 1
and Assumption 2, it is straightforward to see that moving y to the left (respectively, to the
right) increases the breadth. Therefore, the assumption makes breadth maximization less
trivial.
The next two lemmas provide some intuitive results.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, xl is strictly increasing in y ∈ [y, 1] and xr is strictly
increasing in y ∈ [0, y].
From the Lemma above it follows that, under Assumptions 1-3, the breadth-maximizing
news location y∗ always belongs to the interval [y, y]. To see that, consider first y < y.
Hence, xl(y) = 0 and D1(y) = F (xr(y)). Then, xr strictly increasing in [0, y] implies that
y∗ ≥ y. Analogously, it is easy to see that xl strictly increasing in [y, 1] implies that y∗ ≤ y.
Lemma 3. From the symmetry of the distribution of followers, we have that, for any x and
y,
1. µ(x) = 1− µ(1− x);
2. σ2(x) = σ2(1− x);
3. xr(y) = 1− xl(1− y).
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We have the following result regarding (no) polarization of news:
Proposition 2. Assume that the density of direct readers is such that f ′(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈
[0, 1/2).
1. xl(y) being strictly convex for all y ∈ [y, y] is a sufficient condition for no polarization
(i.e., y∗ = 1/2) to maximize the breadth of news sharing.
2. xl(y) being concave enough for all y ∈ [y, y] is a sufficient condition for the limit
polarization strategy (i.e., y∗ = y or y∗ = y) to maximize the breadth of news sharing.
If F is uniformly distributed, xl(y) being strictly concave for all y ∈ [y, y] is a sufficient
condition for the limit polarization strategy to maximize the breadth.















Figure 1: On the left, a convex xl(y) implies that indirect demand is maximized with no
polarization, y∗ = 1/2. On the right, a concave xl(y) implies that indirect demand is
maximized with limit polarization, y∗ = y or y∗ = y.
Although the proposition is general, it is stated in terms of convexity or concavity of
xl(y), the meaning of which is hard to grasp. Therefore, we consider the case of a uniform
F and try to understand the properties of µ(x) and σ2(x) that generate (no) polarization.






2 − (2µxx(y − µ)− σ2xx) 4(y − µ)2
(2µx(y − µ)− σ2x)3
.
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Note that from equation (3), xl strictly increasing in y together with Assumption 3 implies
that (2µx(y − µ)− σ2x) is strictly positive. From this equation, we can analyze the following
cases:






Polarization occurs if µ is convex on [0, 1/2].






(2µx (y − µ)− σ2x)3
> 0.
Polarization never occurs.





2 − 8µxx(y − µ)3
(2µx (y − µ)− σ2x)3
.
Polarization occurs if µ is convex enough on [0, 1/2].





2 + 4σ2xx(y − µ)2
(2µx (y − µ)− σ2x)3
.
Polarization occurs if σ2 is concave enough on [0, 1/2].
The table provides the results for various cases.
Summarizing, we obtain our central result.
Proposition 3. Assume that F (x) is uniformly distributed.
1. No polarization (i.e., y∗ = 1/2) occurs if (i) the mean µ(x) is concave enough or
the variance σ2(x) is convex enough for x ∈ [0, 1/2], or (ii) both the mean µ(x) and
variance σ2(x) are linear for x ∈ [0, 1/2].
2. The limit polarization (i.e., y∗ = y or y∗ = y) occurs if the mean µ(x) is convex enough
or the variance σ2(x) is concave enough for x ∈ [0, 1/2].
13
Constant variance Concave variance Linear variance Convex variance
Concave mean No Yes, if variance con-
cave enough
No No
Linear mean No Yes, if variance con-
cave enough
No No







Table 1: Cases where polarization occurs when f is uniform.
We provide an intuition for why a convex mean µ(x) for x ∈ [0, 1/2] can lead to polar-
ization. Note first that we expect µ(x) to increase with x. Then, a convex µ(x) implies
that it increases in a increasing way for x ∈ [0, 1/2]. This means that the mean followers
of two left-wing extremists with some distance are more closely located than those of two
moderates with the same distance (see Figure 2). Therefore, the benefit from news sharing
B(x, y) decreases more slowly when x increases or decreases from x′ satisfying µ(x′) = y if
the news is located close to the extremists than if it is located close to the moderates. This
leads to the limit polarization.
Direct consumers
Mean followers
Figure 2: Convexity of µ(x) on [0, 1/2] means that the mean followers of extremists are more
closely located to each other than those of moderates.
To provide an intuition for why a concave variance σ2(x) for x ∈ [0, 1/2] can lead to
polarization, suppose that σ2(x) is increasing and concave for x ∈ [0, 1/2]. Then, the sym-
metry around the middle implies that σ2(x) is concave for x ∈ [0, 1] and that it increases for
x ∈ [0, 1/2] and decreases for x ∈ [1/2, 1]. Now, consider y < 1/2, and examine what hap-
pens when y further moves to the left. This movement will induce some left-wing extremists
to start to share the news while inducing some moderates to stop sharing it. However, when
σ2(x) is concave, the decrease in σ2 experienced by the former is larger than any change in
14
σ2 experienced by the latter, which leads to an overall expansion of the breadth. This logic
implies that the limit polarization is optimal.
Let us now examine the effect of the distribution function of direct consumers. As long




is increasing, it leads to ∂D1
∂y
> 0 for y < 1/2 and ∂D1
∂y
< 0 for y > 1/2, resulting in no
polarization as the breadth-maximizing strategy. Analogously, φ decreasing leads to the
limit polarization as the optimal strategy.










Previously, we fixed the sign of f ′ to be nonnegative on [0, 1/2). Now, note that f ′(x) ≥ 0
(resp., ≤ 0) generates a force toward no polarization (resp., the limit polarization). U.S.
experienced a dramatic increase in the polarization of partisan preferences over the past 40
years (Lazer et al., 2018). If it implies that f is decreasing over [0, 1/2), then this increase
in the polarization of preferences makes news polarization more likely in our model.
4 Competition
We here consider competition between two media firms, L and R. Each firm i (with i = L,R)
chooses the ideological position of its news yi. Without loss of generality, we can consider
yL ≤ yR in equilibrium. We consider no targeting and assume that all direct consumers
receive both news items, but each of them shares at most one news item. A direct consumer
shares the news that generates the larger average benefit conditional on it being larger than
the attention tax.
Let [xl(yL), xr(yL)] (resp. [xl(yR), xr(yR)]) be the interval of locations of direct consumers
who prefer sharing the news from firm L (resp. firm R) over not sharing any news. The
functions xl(·) and xr(·) are determined in the same way as in the baseline model. Suppose
that xl(yR) < xr(yL). A direct consumer is indifferent between sharing L’s news and sharing
R’s news if she is located at xm = xm(yL, yR) such that B(xm, yL) = B(xm, yR), which is
equivalent to µ(xm) = (yL + yR)/2. Therefore, the firms’ respective indirect demands are
DL(yL, yR) = F (xm(yL, yR))− F (xl(yL))
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and
DR(yL, yR) = F (xr(yR))− F (xm(yL, yR)) .
Let (y∗L, y
∗
R) represent the equilibrium news locations under competition between the two
media firms. The next lemma shows an intuitive result:
Lemma 4. Under competition between the two media firms, if an equilibrium exists, we must
have y∗L ≤ 1/2 ≤ y∗R.
If the attention tax is low enough, we have xl(1/2) = 0 and xr(1/2) = 1. In that case, as
in the baseline model, we have no polarization.
Proposition 4. Under competition between the two media firms, if the attention tax is low
enough that even the most extreme consumer is willing to share ideologically neutral news,




The above proposition is similar to the result obtained by Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac
(2001) in a Hotelling model in which two newspapers compete in prices. When the nonneg-
ative pricing constraint of newspapers binds due to high advertising revenue, they find that
both newspapers locate at the middle. However, they consider neither social media nor news
sharing.
We now consider the case of τ > B(x = 0, y = 1/2) and study when it is optimal for each
firm to adopt the limit polarization. Suppose that F is uniform. The next proposition shows
that under mild conditions, the limit polarization in the baseline model without competition
implies the limit polarization under competition between the two media firms.
Proposition 5. Suppose that F is uniformly distributed. The limit polarization in the base-
line model without competition implies the limit polarization under competition between the
two media firms y∗L = y and y
∗
R = y whenever, for x ∈ [0, 1/2],
1. µ(x) is convex and σ2x ≤ 0 or σ2x > 0 but small; or
2. µ(x) is linear and σ2(x) is concave but with a slope not very negative.
Note first that the conditions in the proposition such as convex mean and concave variance
are consistent with the limit polarization in the baseline model without competition (see
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Proposition 3). To provide an intuition for the result, suppose that firm L chooses some
yL < y given yR = y. Then, the interval of direct consumers who share L’s news is given by
[xl(yL), xm(yL, y)]. Compare this interval with the interval of sharers [xl(yL), xr(yL)] for a
monopolist choosing the same y = yL. Consider now moving yL slightly to the left. Then, the
induced decrease in xl(yL) is the same in both intervals. However, the induced decrease in
xm(yL, y) is typically smaller than the one in xr(yL). This is because the marginal consumer
under competition, who is located at xm(yL, y), has an outside option of sharing news from
R of which the benefit increases with her location, whereas the marginal consumer in the
baseline model without competition, who is located at xr(yL), has no outside option, which
is akin to having an outside option that does not depend on her location. As yL moves to
the left, the location of the marginal consumer xm(yL, y) also moves to the left, which in
turn makes less attractive the outside option of sharing news from R (see Figure 3).
B(x,yL− ε) B(x,yL) B(x,yR)
xm(yL , yR)xm(yL− ε, yR)0 1
Figure 3: In the figure, firm L moves the location of its news to the left given the location
of R’s news.
5 Extensions
In this section, we provide three extensions of the baseline model.
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5.1 Targeting
Here, we extend the baseline model by enabling the media firm to target an interval of direct
readers. For instance, the Macedonian teenagers, mentioned in the introduction, purchased
bogus Facebook accounts and used them to target certain profiles of users to spread their
fake news.
Suppose that the media firm can target direct consumers belonging to an interval of
given length l ∈ [0, 1) to send its news. Suppose also that direct consumers are uniformly
distributed. Hence, the media firm now should choose not only the location of its news y but
also the target interval [a, a+ l] ⊂ [0, 1] by choosing a. We show that it is a weakly dominant
strategy to choose the optimal location without targeting (i.e., y = y∗) and a = xl(y
∗).
Proposition 6 (Targeting Strategy). Suppose that the media firm can choose both the news
location y and the target interval of direct consumers [a, a + l] ⊂ [0, 1] by choosing a where
l ∈ [0, 1) is exogenously given. Suppose that F is uniformly distributed. It is a weakly
dominant strategy for the firm to choose y = y∗ and a = xl(y
∗).
Proof. We need to distinguish two cases: either a+ l ≤ xr(y∗) or a+ l > xr(y∗). In the first
case, all targeted consumers share the news and one cannot do better. In the second case,
all consumers in the interval [xl(y
∗) , xr(y
∗)] are targeted and share the news and hence one
cannot do better either.
5.2 Resharing
Here, we extend the baseline model by adding one additional layer of communication: the
indirect consumers can share news with their own followers. The utility from reading news
is given by U(x, y) = u − (x − y)2 as before. We maintain the assumption that each group
of followers is distinct at any layer.





where Dn(y) denotes the demand from consumers at the n-th layer of communication and
αn ≥ 0 is a weight for the demand from consumers at the n-th layer.
We below introduce a measure of the degree of homophily.
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Definition 3 (Homophily). Given an ideological segment [a, a + l], let h2(a, l) denote the
measure of 2nd layer consumers whose ideological locations belong to the interval [a, a + l]
and follow a first-layer consumer located in the same interval. We refer to h2(a, l) as the
2nd layer homophily on the interval [a, a + l]. Additionally, we say that the homophily is




< 0 (resp., > 0) for a ∈ [0, 1/2− l/2)> 0 (resp., < 0) for a ∈ (1/2− l/2, 1− l].
We have the following result:
Proposition 7 (Resharing). Suppose that F is uniformly distributed.
1. No polarization in the baseline model implies no polarization in the extension with one
additional layer if homophily is central.
2. The limit polarization in the baseline model implies the limit polarization in the exten-
sion with one additional layer if homophily is extremal.
Asymmetries in the degree of homophily are observed on Twitter by Boutyline and Willer
(2017). Using a data set of the entire Twitter network from 2009, the authors find that
more extreme individuals tend to be more homophilous than more moderate ones. Then,
homophily is extremal and, according to the above proposition, the limit polarization in the
baseline model implies the limit polarization in the extension.
5.3 The depth-maximization strategy
Here, we provide an extension of the baseline model that focuses on the depth of news
sharing. For this purpose, we allow for the resharing of news following down many layers of
communication. We maintain the assumption that each group of followers is distinct at any
layer.
For the resharing to stop at some layer, we assume that the constant u depreciates when
the layer of sharing increases. That is, the utility that a consumer located at x obtains from
reading a news item located at y after it has been shared n = 1, 2, . . . times is
Un(x, y) = δ
n−1u− (x− y)2, with δ ∈ (0, 1),
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max{Un+1(z, y), 0} g̃(z;x) dz.
For the sake of computational simplicity, we adopt a continuous version of the problem.
Let t ∈ [0,+∞) be the time at which a news item located at y reaches an indirect consumer
located at x. Then, a consumer’s utility from reading the news and her benefit of resharing
it will be given, respectively, by
Ut(x, y) = δ
tu− (x− y)2 and Bt(x, y) =
∫ 1
0
max{Ut(z, y), 0} g̃(z;x) dz.
Definition 4 (Depth of News Sharing). We define the depth of news sharing as the max-
imum number of times that a news item is shared following down the hierarchical layers of
communication.
We study the depth-maximization strategy and allow the firm to target only one direct
consumer without loss of generality. Hence, the firm chooses the location of the targeted
consumer and the location of the news item. We have the following result:
Proposition 8 (Depth-Maximizing Strategy). Suppose that the attention tax is not small.
The media firm’s optimal strategy to maximize the depth of news sharing is characterized as
follows:
1. It targets the consumer located at x∗depth whose σ
2(x) is equal to minx∈[0,1/2] σ
2(x).
2. It chooses the location of the news item y∗depth = µ(x
∗
depth).
Corollary 1. Suppose that the attention tax is not small.
1. Depth maximization leads to some polarization as long as σ2(1/2) > minx∈[0,1/2] σ
2(x);
2. If σ2(x) is increasing on [0, 1/2], it leads to x∗depth = 0.
The assumption that the attention tax is not small means that for consumers at the
target location, as the news depreciates, the net benefit of sharing it becomes zero before
the utility of reading it becomes zero. For a given consumer, her benefit from sharing a news
item is maximized when the item has the same location as that of her mean follower. From
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equation (1), this leads to a benefit equal to u−σ2(x). Therefore, it is optimal to target the
location of the direct consumer with the lowest variance σ2(x).
If one considers that false political news tends to be hyperpartisan (Silverman et al.,
2016), our results provide an explanation for the findings of Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018)
that false political news diffused deeper and more broadly than true news. The authors
suggest that the degree of novelty and the extent to which the news is emotionally charged
may explain their findings. Our results suggest that their findings may also be explained by
the structure of social networks: a news item appealing to a group of consumers who have
very homogeneous ideological preferences tend to diffuse deeply.
6 Conclusion
We have studied how the distribution of followers’ ideological preferences shapes a user’s
incentive to share news on social media and how this, in turn, does or not create incentives
for a media firm to provide partisan content. In particular, we have focused on how the
distribution of the mean and the variance of followers’ ideological locations affect the ideo-
logical location of news. We have found that both a convex mean and a concave variance
contribute to polarization when a media firm maximizes the breadth of news sharing.
Although we assumed that both the distribution of direct consumers and that of followers
are symmetric around 1/2, in reality, more conservative individuals are more homophilous
than more liberal ones (Boutyline and Willer (2017)). It would be interesting to extend our
framework to incorporate such asymmetry.
We believe that the most interesting avenue for future research is to examine the role
of news feed algorithms (Berman and Katona, 2020). In the case of Facebook, after a
user decides to share news with her friends, the algorithm determines which subset of her
friends will be exposed to the news. If a social media platform can employ an algorithm
to maximize the amount of time users spend on the platform, will such an engagement-
maximizing algorithm lead to more or less polarization of news?
Another interesting revenue for future research consists in incorporating consumers’ ac-
tions such as voting and study how news consumption and polarization influences their
actions (Galeotti and Mattozzi, 2011, Kranton and McAdams, 2020).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The quasiconcavity of the benefit function implies that, for any y, B(x, y) ≥ min{B(0, y), B(1, y)},
for all x. Additionally, from the symmetry of the problem, maxy∈[0,1] min{B(0, y), B(1, y)} =
B(0, 1/2) (= B(1, 1/2)).
Therefore, if τ ≤ B(0, 1/2), by locating its news at y∗ = 1/2 the media firm can induce
sharing from all direct consumers, thus maximizing the breadth of news sharing.




= 2µx(y − µ)− σ2x.












Taking this together with Assumption 3 and equation (3) implies that both ∂xl/∂y and
∂xr/∂y are positive whenever xl and xr satisfy equation (2).
Proof of Lemma 3
1 and 2 follow directly from our assumption that g̃(z;x) = g̃(1− z; 1− x).
To prove 3, we start by noting that 1 and 2 imply that B(x, y) = B(1 − x, 1 − y)
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]. From that, if xl(y) and xr(y) are solutions for B(x̂, y) = τ , then
1 − xl(y) and 1 − xr(y) are solutions for B(x̂, 1 − y) = τ . Finally, as xl(y) < xr(y) implies
1− xl(y) > 1− xr(y), we have that xl(1− y) = 1− xr(y).
Proof of Proposition 2
1. Take y < 1/2.
(a) From Lemma 2 we have that xl is strictly increasing. Then, xl(y) < xl(1 − y)
for any y < 1/2. Additionally, we have that xl(y) < xr(y) = 1 − xl(1 − y), i.e.,
the distance between xl(y) and 0 is shorter than the distance between xl(1 − y)
and 1. Hence, f ′ ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, 1/2) and symmetry of f imply that f(xl(y)) ≤
f(xl(1− y)) = f(xr(y));




















It is straightforward to verify that y > 1/2 implies ∂D1
∂y
(y) < 0. Therefore, the breadth
is maximized at y∗ = 1/2.




















then the product f(xl)
∂xl
∂y
is decreasing in y, and we have that
∂D1
∂y







Hence, the limit polarization strategy is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3















Therefore, no polarization (respectively, limit polarization) occurs if xl(y) is convex (re-





2 − (2µxx(xl) (y − µ(xl))− σ2xx(xl)) 4 (y − µ(xl))2













and the proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma 4
Let (y∗L, y
∗
R) be an equilibrium with y
∗
L ≤ y∗R.










DL(1− y∗L, y∗R) = xr(1− y∗L)− xm(1− y∗L, y∗R)
= [1− xl(y∗L)]− xm(1− y∗L, y∗R)













R) ≥ 1− xm(1− y∗L, y∗R).











µ (1− xm(1− y∗L, y∗R)) = 1− µ (xm(1− y∗L, y∗R))














R) ≥ 1−xm(1−y∗L, y∗R) if and only if y∗R ≥ 1−y∗R, that is, y∗R ≥ 1/2, which contradicts
our initial hypothesis that y∗R < 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 4
Clearly, y∗L = y
∗
R = 1/2 is an equilibrium since by deviating from the center a firm does not
increases the number of sharing from extremists (since all of them were already sharing) while
it loses sharing from some moderates who now prefer to share the news of its competitor.
In any other tentative equilibrium where one firm, say firm L, plays yL 6= 1/2, the best
reply for firm R is to chose a location yR between yL and 1/2, the closest possible of yL. But
since whenever yR 6= 1/2 then the best reply of firm L is to choose location yL between yR





Proof of Proposition 5









< 0 for y ∈ (y, 1/2)> 0 for y ∈ (1/2, y).
Under competition between the two media firms, we consider the deviation of the L firm

















(y, y) ≤ ∂D1
∂y
(y) for any y ∈ (y, 1/2).
This claim implies |∂DL
∂yL
(y, y)| ≥ |∂D1
∂y
(y)| > 0 for y ∈ (y, 1/2). Hence, if the L firm
moves to the left in (y, 1/2), its indirect demand increases more than the increase in indirect
demand experienced by the monopolist from the same change in y. Therefore, it is optimal





(y, y) for any y ∈ (1/2, y).
This claim implies that if the L firm moves to the right in (1/2, y), its indirect demand
increases less than the increase in indirect demand experienced by the monopolist from the
same change in y.
As the monopolist’s indirect demand is symmetric around 1/2 and is maximized when it





Figure 4: Indirect demand functions of the monopolist and the duopolist. The monopolist
has a larger loss (respectively, gain) than the duopolist for y < 1/2 (respectively, y > 1/2).
Claim 1 is equivalent to ∂xm
∂yL
(y, y) ≤ ∂xr
∂y





(y, y) for y ∈ (1/2, y).
Hence, to prove both claims, it is enough to show ∂xm
∂yL
(y, y) ≤ ∂xr
∂y












2µx(xr) (µ(xr)− y) + σ2x(xr)
.
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Therefore, ∂xm/∂yL ≤ ∂xr/∂y if and only if
2 (2µx(xm)− µx(xr)) (µ(xr)− y) ≥ σ2x(xr).
1. In case we have µ convex on [0, 1/2] and σ2 constant on [0, 1/2]:
From µ(x) convex on [0, 1/2], and from symmetry, follows that µ(x) is concave on
[1/2, 1]. Therefore, for any y ∈ [y, y]
µx (xm(y, y)) > µx (xr(y))























From the above argument, it is clear that ∂xm/∂yL ≤ ∂xr/∂y holds when σ2x < 0 on
[0, 1/2] (or, equivalently, σ2x > 0 on [1/2, 1]) as well.





, the result carries out even if σ2x > 0 but small on [0, 1/2].
2. In case we have µ linear and σ2 concave on [0, 1/2]:
Let µ(x) = mx, for x ∈ [0, 1/2). Hence, µ(x) = 1−m(1− x), for x ∈ (1/2, 1].
In that case, ∂xm
∂yL
(y, y) ≤ ∂xr
∂y
(y) requires σ2x(xr) ≤ 2m (µ(xr)− y), that is, the slope of
σ2 cannot be very negative on [0, 1/2] (equivalently, not very positive on [1/2, 1]).
Both in the case (i) σ2 is linear and µ is either linear or concave and in the case (ii) µ is
linear and σ2 is convex, the limit polarization is not optimal in the baseline model without
competition. Therefore, those cases are ruled out from our analysis.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let us start by showing that the optimum y cannot be more extreme than y∗.






Thus, as xr(y) is increasing in y, also D2(y) is increasing in y for any y ≤ y∗.
Suppose that the limit polarization is optimal in the one-layer maximization problem.
Then, for any y ∈ (y∗, 1/2], we have that xr(y) − xl(y) < xr(y∗) − xl(y∗) = xr(y∗). It is






∗);x) dx = h1 (0, xr(y
∗)) .
Thus, if homophily is extremal, for any y ∈ (y∗, 1/2], we have
D2(y
∗) = h2(0, xr(y
∗)) > h2(xl(y), xr(y
∗)).
In addition, the following inequality holds
h2(xl(y), xr(y






















where the last inequality comes from the non-negativity of the terms with integrals. This
proves that the limit polarization maximizes the second-layer indirect demand.
The proof for the case of no polarization is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 8
Let t∗ denote the depth of sharing the news located at y. Since, by assumption, a consumer
located at x reshares the news located at y whenever both Ut(y)(x, y) ≥ 0 and Bt∗(x, y) ≥ τ ,




Ut∗(z, y) g̃(z;x) dz
= δt
∗
u− σ2(x)− (y − µ(x))2 .
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And from Bt(y)(x, y) = τ follows that
δt
∗
u− τ = σ2(x) + (y − µ(x))2 .
As the L.H.S. of the equation above is decreasing in t∗, the depth is maximized when the
R.H.S. is minimized. The result follows.
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